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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DISASTER AT LIPPE CANAL BRIDGE
Markus Herten
German Federal Waterways Engineering and
Research Institute, Karlsruhe
Foundation Engineering Section
(Bundesanstalt für Wasserbau, BAW)

Eva Dornecker
German Federal Waterways Engineering and
Research Institute, Karlsruhe
Foundation Engineering Section
(Bundesanstalt für Wasserbau, BAW)

ABSTRACT
In October 2005, during construction works at the new Lippe canal bridge, massive water leakage from the Dortmund-Ems-Canal
occurred below a wing wall at the northern abutment of the old, still operated canal bridge. Water passed through a leak of the claylined canal, flowing underneath a pile-supported wing wall into a minor excavation pit. This excavation pit was supposed to be
protected by a surcharge filter. Since failure of the lining should be considered for all construction phases, it cannot be regarded as the
cause of the disaster. Consequently, the paper focuses on the verification against hydraulic heave and erosion for the excavation pit. It
is demonstrated that Terzaghi’s statements on this topic remain valid and should not fall into oblivion.
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INTRODUCTION

The Lippe canal bridge is a navigable aqueduct carrying the
Dortmund-Ems-Canal (DEK) over the River Lippe. It was
planned to replace the old Lippe canal bridge by a new set of
parallel twin span bridges, each serving north- or southbound
ship traffic. On October 11th 2005, during construction works
at the new Lippe Canal Bridge, massive water leakage from
the DEK occurred below a wing wall at the northern abutment
of the old, still fully operational canal bridge. By closing the
safety gates Datteln and Schlieker, the canal stretch that was
emptied could be limited to 8 km (cf. Fig. 1). As the water

could flow freely into the Lippe and as the involved engineers
acted with care, personal injuries were avoided. However, the
damage removal alone cost more than $ 20 million and the
canal had to be closed for several weeks. In the following, the
project and the accident are described briefly. Moreover, this
paper presents some conclusions made from the investigation
on the verification against hydraulic heave and erosion for the
excavation pit, which was performed by BAW after the
accident.

Fig. 1: Site plan
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Fig. 2: Aerial photograph of the construction works (August 18th, 2005)
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The DEK is being expanded to meet the requirements of larger
motor cargo vessels. This measure requires the renewal of the
canal bridges spanning the Ems and Lippe Rivers.
Construction works at the Lippe canal bridge started in spring
2004. The construction of the Ems canal bridge is planned to
start soon. The aerial photograph of the Lippe canal bridge
(Fig. 2) shows that the construction area is situated in an
above-ground canal stretch of the DEK. The embankment
crest is at approx. 15 m above the natural terrain. The regular
water level of the Lippe River is about 16 m below the regular
water level in the canal. The DEK embankments are made of
silty sands. The building ground consists of sandy marl.During
construction works continuous ship traffic is maintained. This
is why a new steel trough was installed directly adjacent to the
existing trough made of concrete. It was not until the new
trough was put into operation that the old canal bridge was
supposed to be sealed off and demolished. The old aqueduct is
supposed to be replaced by another new trough at the same
location. At the time of the accident, the construction works
on the new trough at the north side had almost as much
progressed as the works on the south side in August 2005, as
shown in Fig. 2.
The northern abutments of the old and the new canal bridge
were constructed on a spread footing at 37.00 m above sea
level (asl) on sandy marl. On the south side it is the same
construction, but the sandy marl is found two meters deeper in
elevation.
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The old and new wing walls are founded on piles which reach
into the sandy marl layer. The lower edge of the old
northeastern wing wall is located at a much greater height
(43.50 m asl) than the footing of the abutments.
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DISASTER

On the day of the accident large steel parts were delivered by
ship and unloaded by a truck mounted telescope crane. Shortly
before noon, a worker observed leakage between the northern
abutments of the old and the new canal bridge. Members of
the construction supervision were immediately informed. They
found a water whirl in the canal in front of the wing wall of
the old northern abutment (Fig. 3). The leakage increased
substantially within a short time period. The water from the
canal flew first into a small construction pit (Fig. 4), passing
under a wing wall footed on piles (Fig. 5). This construction
pit was supposed to be protected by a surcharge drain. Then
the water flew through the two abutments into the Lippe River
(Fig. 6).
Disaster alarm was triggered and the safety gates Datteln and
Schlieker were closed after all the ships had left the canal
stretch (cf. Fig. 1). A downspout was moreover opened to
empty the canal stretch. Several attempts to close the leak with
soil material on the canal side failed (Fig. 7). Due to the high
flow velocities, the embankment next to the wing wall eroded
totally (Fig. 8). An 8 km long canal stretch was emptied
completely. The water from the canal flew around the old and
the new wing walls into the Lippe River.

2

Fig. 3: Water whirl in front of the wing wall of the northern abutment

Fig. 4: View of the construction pit between the two abutments
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Fig. 5: Cross section of the footing at level 45 m asl; water flowing towards the surcharge drain

Fig. 6: Violent water flow through the two abutments into the Lippe River
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Fig. 7: Attempt to close the leak by dumping soil material into the canal

Fig. 8: Aerial photograph of the failed embankment next to the concerned wing wall
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HYDRAULIC HEAVE

The European Standard EN 1997-1 (2004) distinguishes
between four types of ground failure, including failure due to
pore-water pressure or pore-water seepage:
–
–
–
–

uplift,
heave,
internal erosion, and
piping.

soil stratum is defined as internal erosion. Piping is restricted
to the occurrence of a pipe-shaped discharge tunnel, whereas
according to Terzaghi (1947) piping includes heave as well.
The factor of safety Gs is determined by the ratio of the
submerged weight W’ of the body of soil and the total excess
hydrostatic pressure Ue at the bottom of a column (Fig. 10b).
Gs 

When pore-water pressure under a structure or a low
permeability ground layerbecomes larger than the mean
overburden pressure failure by uplift occurs. Failure by heave
occurs when upwards seepage forces act against the weight of
the soil, reduce the vertical effective stress to zero. Soil
particles are then lifted away by the vertical water flow and
failure occurs (boiling). Transport of soil particles within a

W
Ue

(1)

Ue is equivalent to the seepage force mentioned in EN 1997-1.
The European Standard allows including pore water pressure
and total stress into the calculation, while the German national
annex does not. As the European Standard uses a partial factor
of safety, the equations differ from Terzaghi’s formula.
However, this does not matter in the following discussion.

Fig. 9: Graphical determination of safety (from: Terzaghi K.(1947), Fig. 79)
Terzaghi further mentions in regard to failure by heave: “With
sufficient accuracy we can assume that the body of sand which
is lifted by the water has the shape of a prism with a width D/2
and a horizontal base at some depth D3 below the surface. […]
For the simple row of sheet piles represented in Figure 79b an
investigation has shown that the critical section passes almost
exactly through the lower edge of the sheet piles, or D3 = D.”
In Germany, this is defined as the failure body after Terzaghi.
Instead of using a potential net, another way of simplification
is used in Germany for such a case; the potential at this wall
base is calculated based on the formula by Brinch Hansen
(1953), which is also mentioned in EAU (2004). According to
this approach, instead of a prism with a width D/2, only a flow
channel needs to be examined. The result for the simple row
of sheet piles represented in Figure 9b would be on the safe
side.
If the lining of the DEK canal is intact, only the groundwater
interact with the Lippe River below the embankments and no
failure due to water can occur. However, if the canal lining is
leaking, a substantial amount of canal water may flow into the
ground, leading to rising groundwater levels. At German
waterways, the failure of a lining is always to be considered at
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least as an accidental design situation according to the Code of
Practice “Stability of Embankments at German Inland
Waterways (MSD)” (BAW, 2011). In the following, reasons
for a failed clay lining will not be examined. Instead, the
paper focuses on the verification of stability, and especially on
the verification against hydraulic heave in this particular case.
Furthermore, assumptions (e.g. on the ground) are simplified
for better understanding.
Fig. 10 depicts a cross section of the northeast wing wall
between the two abutments. As already mentioned, the wing
wall is founded on piles, which reach into the marl layer. If the
clay lining fails, canal water can flow through the noncohesive soil around the wing wall towards the pit bottom
(Fig. 5 and 10). According to BAW (2011), potential
degradation below the pile head slab is not to be considered in
case of structures founded on piles. This means that a
hydraulically effective gap is to be expected between the pile
head slab and the subsoil. Using a simplified approach, as
potential degradation is to be neglected; the thickness of the
construction can be reduced correspondingly. The wing wall,
which can be up to 8 m wide, may be regarded as a sheet-pile
wall (cf. structural scheme Fig. 10).
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Fig. 10: Cross section of the northeast wing wall and structural scheme
The columns examined are described in Figure 11. The water
level on the landward side corresponds to the red line.
Assuming that the ground is homogeneous and no surcharge
drain is installed, the safety against hydraulic heave would be
much smaller than unity in regard to the permitted excavation
bottom (Fig. 11a). For sufficient safety, the surface should be
much higher (Fig. 11b). However, this was not possible due to
the construction progress. Instead, a deeper pit was dug and a
surcharge drain applied (Fig. 11c). The surface had to be on
the level shown in Figure 11a. The safety was verified with
the failure body according to Terzaghi, including the weight
on the drain (Fig. 11c). But with a surcharge drain at the
bottom of the sheet pile, the calculated safety would be infinite
since the excess hydrostatic pressure Ue is zero (Fig. 11d).
A more realistic result is obtained if, as described in Terzaghi
(1947), the balance is considered not only at the wall base but
also at other depths D3  D (Fig. 9c). Terzaghi writes: “The
investigation can be repeated for different horizontal sections
through the sand, which are located at different depths D3
below the bottom of the pit. The critical head is determined by
the condition hp = minimum, and the horizontal section to
which this minimum refers is the critical section. It represents
the lower boundary of the mass of sand subject to lifting in the
initial state of the piping phenomenon.” However, this was not
considered when planning the excavation pit at the canal
bridge Lippe and hence a false safety was calculated.
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Fig. 11: Different columns reaching down to the lower edge of
the sheet pile
Numerical analyses conducted by BAW show that even if
Terzaghi’s statements are considered, the necessary thickness
of the surcharge drain df becomes less if the leftover soil at the
sheet pile bottom is removed. In the diagram (cf. Fig.12), h
equates h1 and t equates D according to Terzaghi. If t/h
equates zero, the upper line in the diagram drops after
reaching a peak. As this is surprising, BAW ordered
experimental tests to be executed at the Bundeswehr
University Munich to verify the theoretical results (Schober et.
al. 2011). As shown by the lower line in the diagram, the same
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effect occurred in the test. The two lines are not identical since
the calculation was performed only for the maximum
thickness of the surcharge drain df without uniform
distribution. Thus Terzaghi’s statements were confirmed.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

The disaster at the Lippe canal bridge shows that failure of a
bottom lining is no theoretical load case at all, especially if
construction works are performed. But the failure of the lining
only triggered the disaster. It cannot be regarded as its cause
because at German waterways, failure of the lining needs to be
considered for all construction phases.
Because a legally binding agreement on the distribution of the
financial losses between owner and contractor has not been
reached yet, no further information concerning the relevant
cause of the disaster at Lippe canal bridge can be given at this
point.
However, erosion and hydraulic heave can be avoided by
considering Terzaghi’s recommendations. Although he
published his works in the first half of the last century, they
should not fall into oblivion.
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